DEBATE
MEDICARE: DID THE DEVIL MAKE US DO IT?
In this lively and creative debate, Professors David Hyman and Jill
Horwitz argue about the virtues and vices of the federal Medicare
program. As some predict a bleak future for the American’s government’s ability (or inability) to continue paying for Medicare as the
population ages, this debate shows that there is genuine disagreement
about the severity of the problem.
In his Opening Statement, Professor Hyman offers a satirical letter
to the Devil from one of his demonic servants, describes the Medicare
program through the lens of the seven deadly sins. Arguing that
Medicare’s faults are represented in each sin, the servant promises
that Medicare is on track to “destabilize the virtue of the American
republic.” Hyman’s fictional minion predicts that, unless the federal
government enforces “fiscal discipline” on the program, the Medicare
program will “implode within two generations.” Hyman advocates for
a market-based solution, believing that “[i]f people spending their
own money don’t want what the Medicare program is offering, we are
by definition spending more on health care than we should, and, in
doing so, we are undermining the fiscal integrity of the nation as a
whole.” He writes, “[o]nly the Devil could come up with something
that fiendishly clever.”
Professor Horwitz responds by arguing that some of Medicare’s
supposed vices to be not as sinful as Hyman presents them and that
“there may be some virtue buried in that program design.” While she
agrees that the Medicare system as it exists today is flawed, she counters that Hyman’s “preferred design, one more oriented to the market,
would generate plenty of its own injustice.” Horwitz ultimately argues
for a smarter, more effective Medicare program, one that applies “the
many tools that we have in our toolbox” and would involve a “more
comprehensive implementation than we’ve had before.” These
changes and modifications should aim to towards “controlling spending and improving quality,” but Horwitz also urges caution in making
those changes, as any step will have reverberations that will be felt
everywhere.”
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OPENING STATEMENT
Medicare: Did the Devil Make Us Do It?
1

David A. Hyman
INTRODUCTION

In 2004, I was invited to a conference celebrating the 40th anniversary of Medicare—the federal program that provides health insurance to approximately forty-two million (primarily elderly) Americans.
At the conference, I presented an article satirizing the excesses and
dysfunctions of Medicare. See David A. Hyman, Medicare Meets Mephistopheles, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165 (2003). The article takes the
form of a memo from a junior bureaucrat in the Department of Illness and Satanic Services (“DISS”) to the Devil, reporting on the progress of their plans to create a program (Medicare) that incorporates
all seven of the deadly sins and undermines the distinctively American
virtues of thrift and truth-telling.
The paper was subsequently expanded into a book, Medicare Meets
Mephistopheles (2006). Professor Jill Horwitz wrote a lengthy review of
the book, which appears in the Michigan Law Review. See Jill R. Horwitz, The Virtues of Medicare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1001 (2008). The editors of PENNumbra have graciously agreed to provide a forum for author and critic to engage directly with one another.
This initial installment summarizes the central themes of the
book. Professor Horwitz will then summarize her review. I will respond, and then Professor Horwitz will have the last word.
With that out of the way, on with the satire:

1

Richard & Marie Corman Professor of Law and Professor of Medicine, University
of Illinois.
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MEMORANDUM
To:

His Most Exalted Satanic Majesty
7th Circle of Hell, Hell

From: Underling Demon 666
Deputy Assistant Special Coordinator for
Accelerating Recruitment (“DASCAR”)
Department of Illness and Satanic Services
(“DISS”)
Re:

Market Share Report—United States of America

Per your request, I report herein on the progress of our attempts
to corrupt the American republic. Happily, our market share in the
United States grows with every day that passes. Our growth has been
particularly precipitous since we repackaged our product in 1965.
As you know, the recipe we have used for centuries (avarice, gluttony, envy, sloth, lust, anger, and vanity—known hereinafter collectively as the “Seven Deadly Sins”) has always worked perfectly well in
most of the known world. Unfortunately, Americans proved curiously
resistant to the charms of the Seven Deadly Sins. Through almost two
centuries, Americans persisted in doing unto others as they would
have done unto to themselves, working hard and playing by the rules,
staying in school, saving for a rainy day, going to church, donating to
charities, volunteering their time to worthy causes, and generally behaving like goody-two-shoes at every conceivable occasion. Although
we have long had considerable success with our recruiting efforts
among certain groups of Americans (i.e. members of Congress and
lawyers), these groups were unable to do serious damage as long as
the rest of the population behaved itself.
As such, it was a stroke of evil genius for your eminence to come
up with the idea of creating a governmental program that would corrupt everything and everyone it touched. See SATAN, DESTABILIZING
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC WITH A GOVERNMENT-MANDATED INTERGENERATIONAL PYRAMID SCHEME (Brimstoneware Press 1964). The
program works insidiously, so that the citizenry do not perceive its
consequences until it is far too late. Indeed, they vigorously defend
the program against all criticisms, and, ironically enough, believe the
program’s critics are allied with us!
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I refer, of course, to the Medicare program, whose every feature
bears the distinctive stamp of your subtle genius. This memo reviews
each of the seven deadly sins and details the ways in which the Medicare program incorporates and reinforces each sin. It then outlines
how the Medicare program allows us to undermine the distinctively
American virtues of thrift and truth-telling. Finally, it outlines the risk
of exorcism, which has the potential to undo our demonic plans.
I. THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS OF MEDICARE
A. Avarice
Avarice primarily affects the 1.3 million providers who deliver
goods and services to Medicare beneficiaries. Medicare has resulted
in an artesian well of money for these providers—but the whole point
of avarice is that more than most is never quite enough. Providers accordingly agitate ceaselessly for increases in Medicare payments–-and
as a concentrated special interest, they have had considerable success
in extracting ever-increasing sums from the federal fisc. Consistent
with our larger goals, Medicare’s compensation arrangements pay
providers based on their inputs (procedures performed or time spent)
and not their outputs (high quality care actually delivered), creating
predictable results on the quality and cost of care actually delivered.
B. Gluttony
Gluttony primarily affects Medicare beneficiaries. At the outset of
the Medicare program, the costs of care (both per beneficiary and total) were relatively modest, and beneficiaries were responsible for a
substantial percentage of the cost of care. The politics of Medicare
created a one-way ratchet, shifting the distribution of costs toward
those paying for the Medicare program (i.e. the working population)
and away from Medicare beneficiaries. Because the working population is, as a group, less well off than those on Medicare, our efforts
have resulted in a reverse-Robin Hood health care scheme, which robs
from the (working) poor and gives to the middle and upper classes.
C. Envy
Because Medicare’s payment system is heavily influenced by local
costs of production, and total payments are similarly affected by local
treatment patterns, the cost to the Medicare program (and hence the
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amount of resources spent per beneficiary) varies greatly among the
several states, as well as within those states. One group of commentators has estimated that we could buy each and every Medicare beneficiary in Florida who agreed to receive their health care in Minnesota a
new fully-loaded Lexus GS400 and the Medicare program would still
come out ahead. See John E. Wennberg, Elliot S. Fisher, & Jonathan S.
Skinner, Geography and the Debate Over Medicare Reform, HEALTH
AFF. W96, W96-W97, Feb. 13, 2002, available at http://
content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.96v1.pdf.
These geographically-based disparities, and the envy they have
triggered, precipitated a “formula fight” among the several states,
complete with litigation and coalitions of aggrieved states and senior
citizens. We are particularly lucky that the Senate Finance Committee
is disproportionately composed of Senators from low-cost states, who
are extremely aggrieved that the Medicare money train does not
unload their “fair share” of Medicare money in their jurisdictions.
D. Sloth
Sloth primarily affects program administrators. Program administrators care a lot about cost, a bit less about access, and, at least historically, not at all about quality. This is no accident; indeed, the fundamental structure of Medicare was designed at every turn to reflect
these priorities. Any provider who meets the (limited) entry requirements is entitled to participate in Medicare, and patients are free to
choose any provider who will have them–-meaning that program administrators have little or no ability to keep out of the program providers whose quality they are unimpressed with or to reward providers
whose quality is exemplary.
E. Lust
The Medicare program induces lust for program expansion
among Democrats. Although we periodically tantalize Democrats with
proposals to add the “near-elderly” to Medicare, we adhere to your
original plan to resist program expansion at all costs. As you correctly
perceived many years ago, allowing everyone into Medicare will immediately bankrupt the program, as the cross-subsidies which sustain
Medicare are only achievable if there are sufficient marks outside the
program to pay the necessary funds into the program. Medicare’s
beneficiaries understand this point perfectly well; the demise of President Clinton’s Health Security Act was inevitable once it became clear
it would “take” from the elderly and “give” to the uninsured.
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Medicare also provides Democrats with the tools to satisfy their
lust for power. Of course, the lust for power is innate in all politicians
and political parties. However, Democrats disproportionately emphasize Medicare in their appeals to the electorate, and have used the
program as a bludgeon against their Republican adversaries at every
conceivable turn, regardless of the actual magnitude of differences
between the parties, the bipartisanship of the effort, and the financial
straits in which the Medicare program finds itself.
F. Anger
Medicare triggers anger among Republicans. Democrats have
successfully positioned themselves as the protectors of the Medicare
program and of program beneficiaries. The Republicans cannot
“outbid” the Democrats on Medicare without busting the budget, and
their efforts to revise the financing of Medicare and its delivery options are routinely and effectively demagogued.
Not surprisingly, Republicans are angry about the effectiveness
with which a large command and control program, that is inexorably
gobbling up an ever-increasing share of federal tax revenues, has become a sacrosanct feature of American politics. The madder they get,
the less credible their efforts to escape the box in which your eminence has placed them.
I also note that the debate over the 2003 Medicare prescription
drug benefit caused the parties to switch sins, at least temporarily.
Republicans’ lust for political power caused them to vote for a dramatic expansion of Medicare, even though doing so was flatly inconsistent with their long-standing concerns about the fiscal integrity of
the program and its impact on the budget. Similarly, the design of
the prescription drug benefit and their inability to claim credit for
program expansion made Democrats so angry they asserted that
G.O.P. stood for “Getting Old People.” See Hyman, supra, at 64 (quoting Ed Markey, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Medicare Rx Debate (PBS television broadcast June 27, 2003) (transcript available at http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/jan-june03/medicare_0627.html)).
G. Vanity
Normally, policy analysts are stereotypical “goo-goos,” insisting on
the dotting of every “I” and the crossing of every “T” before they will
allow government money to be spent on anything. Yet, in Medicare,
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the same analysts have bestowed their enthusiasm on a program that
systematically and routinely pays (and frequently over-pays!) for the
mistreatment of the vulnerable Americans left in its charge. Your efforts have led them to reason sub silentio that a program offering a rotten benefits package, mediocre quality health care, and run-away costs
is better than no program at all.

II. UNDERMINING AMERICAN VIRTUES
A program incorporating the seven deadly sins would never attain
its intended objectives unless we simultaneously undermined the two
American virtues that would otherwise impede our efforts: thrift and
truth-telling.
A. Thrift
As you know, Medicare’s financing is structured so that current
beneficiaries are paid with funds secured from current taxpayers-–
frequently referred to as “pay as you go.” Demographic trends and
the ever-increasing cost of health care ensure that the program’s economics are simply unsustainable–-a fact that was clear even before the
prescription drug benefit made things worse, when it was added in
2003. The extent to which Medicare, with its “promise now, pay later”
approach has succeeded in undermining thrift is exemplified by the
comments of the U.S. Comptroller General, who described Medicare
on 60 Minutes as a “fiscal cancer.” 60 Minutes: U.S. Heading For Financial Trouble? (CBS television broadcast July 8, 2007), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/01/60minutes/main2528
226.shtml.
To summarize, we are lucky that no one has (so far) “connected
the dots” of the fundamental features of Medicare:
1. Short-term viability dependent on continuous addition of
new participants/funds;
2. Unsustainable long-term promises;
3. Early “investors” paid off with subsequent “investor” contributions;
4. Arguments from security/fidelity/solidarity to ensure continued participation.
Once these dots are connected, it is clear that Medicare is of a
piece with one of your most successful initiatives—the pyramid
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scheme—this time structured on an inter-generational basis. Pyramid
schemes are invariably shut down as soon as they are discovered, on
the grounds that those who were suckered at the outset have no right
to share their misery with others. Pyramid scheme organizers are also
treated harshly by the legal system, on the grounds that defrauding
hundreds or thousands of people is much worse than defrauding a
handful of people. Indeed, were anyone other than the United States
government running the Medicare program, those responsible would
already be serving long prison terms for fraud. However, you cleverly
positioned Medicare as a sacred inter-generational trust, suggesting
rhetorically that the pyramid scheme must be maintained, if not expanded, at every conceivable occasion.
Despite our repeated efforts to disguise the truth about Medicare
through the endless repetition of misleading rhetoric (principally the
phrase “trust fund”), many Americans are coming to realize that
Medicare is, in fact, an elaborate inter-generational pyramid scheme.
Indeed, no less a “New Democrat” authority than The New Republic has
been forced to observe, “if there’s a big problem with Medicare these
days, it’s the program’s lack of long-term financial viability.” See
Hyman, supra, at 81 (quoting Jonathan Cohn, The Single Guy, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Nov. 22, 2002, ¶ 12). Thankfully, our framing of the Medicare program as a sacred inter-generational trust has significantly
dampened the outrage that would otherwise result; the New Republic
would not have been nearly as complacent had the sentence been “if
there’s a big problem with Enron these days, it’s the company’s lack of
long-term financial viability”-–although the principal difference between the two arrangements is that Medicare’s “lack of long-term financial viability” is much worse than Enron’s.
B. Truth-Telling
As you predicted, entitlement programs have provided numerous
opportunities for political dissembling. The ceaseless use of misleading terminology, such as trust fund, is one aspect of the phenomenon.
This terminology is used to suggest that Medicare contributions are
being saved, even though the money that comes in is spent as soon as
it is received, or it is loaned to the Treasury in exchange for a commitment binding on future taxpayers.
Yet, the full effects of Medicare on political truth-telling are best
manifested by the whoppers politicians will tell to justify their attempts
to save the program from self-destruction, or to extract political advantage from the “reform” proposals of their opponents. Both Repub-
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licans and Democrats know they are unelectable if they speak candidly
about the economic problems facing Medicare. The Republicans accordingly package their reform proposals as attempts to “modernize”
the Medicare benefit package, and offer beneficiaries more options.
The Democrats focus their efforts on price caps and prayer. Neither
approach is likely to lead to the minimum expected of a private insurance plan or investment-–actuarially and economically sustainable
promises to purchasers/investors.
III. THREATS TO THE DEMONIC PLOT
Our strategy has been so successful that there is only a limited
prospect of exorcism. The most concrete threats are proposals to fully
means test Medicare or convert it into a defined contribution plan.
Other risks include the outright repeal of Medicare Part D and Medicare’s increasing enthusiasm for leveraging its purchasing power to
enhance quality and lower cost. Any of these reforms will fragment
the coalition of support that currently sustains the inter-generational
pyramid scheme we have created and nurtured.
IV. SUMMARY
All of the building blocks are in place for our plans to destabilize
the virtue of the American republic. The Medicare budget is heading
for a brick wall at an accelerating rate. Every attempt to impose fiscal
discipline triggers squeals of outrage from affected providers, beneficiary groups, and true believers in the inter-generational pyramid
scheme you have created.
Our best calculation is that the Medicare program will completely
implode within two generations-–and efforts to “reform” Medicare will
extend the process only slightly, while simultaneously breeding dissension and class warfare–-precisely the objectives outlined in your original memo.
Have a hellish day.
CONCLUSION
Of course, Medicare is not a demonic plot, and it is libelous to
suggest so (or would be, if one could libel a government program).
However, satire provides a tool with which to explore some of Medicare’s problems in a less confrontational way than might otherwise be
the case. At least that’s my story, and I’m sticking to it.
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Despite the claims of its defenders, Medicare is not a sacred bond
between the generations. It is just another government program–-and
a pretty mediocre one at that.
The first rule of holes is simple: when you find yourself in one,
stop digging. Medicare Meets Mephistopheles is a satirical attempt to provoke Medicare’s defenders and the American public to acknowledge
that we are in a hole and that we should stop digging.
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REBUTTAL
Medicare and the Cardinal Virtues
Jill R. Horwitz

†

As Professor Hyman mentioned in his Opening Statement, our
first PENNumbra exchange summarizes much longer works—
Professor Hyman’s recent book and my review in the Michigan Law
Review. See Jill R. Horwitz, The Virtues of Medicare, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1001 (2008).For those with the fortitude to engage the details—and
one of my main points in this Rebuttal is that in toting up the vices
and virtues of Medicare, the details matter—I urge readers to consult
the longer works.
Despite rumors to the contrary, Professor Hyman does not work in
the Devil’s employ. He really wants to make the health care system
better and, in doing so, to make us all healthier and happier; he
thinks the best way to do it is to eliminate the Devil’s handiwork—big
government. I confess that the idea of relying on the market to provide health care has theoretical appeal. We mainly rely on the market
to provide goods that are just as, if not more, important than health
care. We may regulate the provision of food and housing quite extensively, but we manage to get them to millions of people through pretty
well-functioning markets and without anything like all the kerfuffle
about health care. Newspapers and scholarly journals are not filled
with endless streams of articles bemoaning the growth of spending on
either. So why not just get rid of all this unnecessary bureaucracy?
It turns out that conducting an exorcism isn’t so easy. If you are
looking for evidence of a demonic presence here on Earth you need
to look in a place far less obvious than a government program; you
need to look deeper, into the very nature of health care. Who else but
the Devil would create illness so rampant, medical treatment so complex, knowledge so limited, and the need for such fast decisionmaking? This is why health care markets are filled with failure, and
the government, mostly, isn’t to blame.
That is not to say that Professor Hyman’s assessment of Medicare—that it spends too much, for the wrong reasons, on second-rate
stuff, and from the pockets of the poor—–entirely misses its mark.

†

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, and Faculty Research
Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Medicare is enormous, and it’s growing fast. (Though whether its
growth is unsustainable is an open question.) We ought to do a better
job at considering its distributional consequences. A closer look at
Professor Hyman’s complaints reveals that maybe Medicare isn’t as
sinful as he suggests. In fact, there may be some virtue buried in that
program design.
I. MEDICARE’S VICES ACCORDING TO HYMAN
A. Avarice
Medicare is vast. It covers approximately forty-four million people
and spends over $370 billion dollars every year. (And, by the way,
Medicaid spends almost just as much.) Pretty soon even these dollars
might come to look like pocket change. Some analysts predict that by
2050, Medicare spending alone will increase to 9.2% of GDP from
2.6% in 2005, both because of growth in the cost of medicine and the
graying of America. See David M. Cutler, The Potential for Cost Savings
in Medicare’s Future, HEALTH AFF. W5-R77, W5-R78, Sept. 26, 2005,
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.
r77v1. It’s even worse than that. If you are looking for a culprit for
total spending, you can blame Medicare for inducing more private
spending on health care as well as public spending. See Amy Finkelstein, The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance: Evidence from the Introduction of Medicare 15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 11619, 2005).
Evidence of spending, however, isn’t evidence of avarice. Most
health care providers aren’t stealing money. They are being paid for
providing medical care. Why should we care how much money we
spend on health care anyway? Per capita health spending varies considerably (more than 100 to 1) across nations. See William D.
Savedoff, What Should a Country Spend On Health Care?, 26 HEALTH AFF.
962, 962 (2007). Ironically, spending on medical care is lower in
countries with public systems than with private systems. See David M.
Cutler, Health Care and the Public Sector, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 2143, 2168 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds. 2002).
People have to spend their money on something. The percentage of
GDP spent on health care can be understood as a matter of national
choice, not whether the country can afford the bill. Many people argue that the U.S. has made the right choice in spending on health
care because it has meant that we are living longer and healthier lives.
See Michael E. Chernew et al., Increased Spending on Health Care: How
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Much Can the United States Afford?, 22 HEALTH AFF. 15 (2003). Some
have even argued that over time we ought to be spending even more
than we are today. See Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, The Value of
Life and the Rise in Health Spending, 122 Q.J. ECON. 39, 40 (2007). So
spending per se isn’t a problem. It is a problem, however, if it means
that we have to give up too many other goods that matter for our quality of life. If more spending on health care means less education for
children then that’s a problem. But if it means a little less violent entertainment, that might be evidence not of a sin, but of a virtue—
prudence.
A harder question than whether we are spending too much on
health care is whether we are spending efficiently. Inefficiency explains some, although not all, of why U.S. health spending is higher
than health spending elsewhere. This doesn’t necessarily mean that
we should spend less even though it does mean that we should spend
smarter. This is because variations in spending patterns are so complex—-additional spending in some regions is worth it and in others is
not—-you don’t improve the efficiency of Medicare spending by simply refusing to buy the next dollar of health care.
B. Gluttony
“Underling Demon 666” is perhaps proudest of Medicare’s ability
to tempt people into spending more of their money–-and even more
delicious, other people’s money—on health care than they would absent insurance. Medicare’s supposed Gluttony refers to two distinct
problems that are critical to disentangle: (1) moral hazard and (2)
inequitable distribution.
Moral hazard is an inevitable cost of insurance. It occurs when an
individual is less careful than usual or consumes more than she otherwise would because she doesn’t have to pay all the costs of an accident or her consumption. Although people may not be less careful
with their bodies just because they have insurance, they do go to the
doctor more. Professor Hyman thinks that Medicare has turned its
patients into diners who take an extra trip to the all-you-can-eat buffet.
They are plenty full and wouldn’t order another course if they had to
pay for it, but, because they don’t, they pile the food on their plates.
No doubt some people buy an extra course of care that they don’t
need just because Medicare picks up the tab. Yet the analogy is
stretched. People generally become patients because they are sick,
not because they are insured. Medicine isn’t like food; it doesn’t usually taste good. And unlike estimating the cost of an additional serv-
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ing of dessert, measuring moral hazard in the health care context is
notoriously hard. Doing it the usual way—looking at what people
would consume absent insurance and deciding the rest is moral hazard—isn’t accurate. People mostly consume more medical care when
they are insured because they can’t afford it otherwise. They may very
well value it at much more than its cost. So, yes, health insurance induces many patients to get the surgery, but this is often the virtue of
insurance, not its vice.
C. Gluttony II
One of Professor Hyman’s biggest concerns is that Medicare is a
reverse–Robin Hood scheme. Because of its reliance on payroll taxes,
it takes from the young and the working poor and gives to the retired
wealthy. Here the Devil is in the details. Let’s consider a few different
questions about the way Medicare redistributes.
(1) Does Medicare transfer money from workers who are young to
retirees who are old? Yes, it’s supposed to. Elderly retirees need
health insurance more than younger workers because, on average,
they get sick more. Besides, young people turn into old people;
they’ll not only have their turn to be beneficiaries—they’ll be quite
happy to find that they are consuming something much better: tomorrow’s medicine.
Professor Hyman worries that the young won’t ever get their turn
because Medicare is a pyramid scheme that is going to come crashing
down. This is debatable. Whether transfers will grow depends on how
medicine changes and how much it will cost. For example, we don’t
know whether genomic developments will make medicine more or
less expensive and efficient. Further, demographics are not destiny.
Whether Medicare, like other large social insurance programs, is sustainable depends on economic growth. Historically, each successive
generation is more productive than the last. Even so, forecasting fifty
years and more into the future is a perilous business. Neither pessimism nor optimism is justified.
Regardless, restructuring Medicare to avoid these explicit intergenerational transfers will not necessarily help. Absent Medicare, elderly people would find some way to get care and cost-shifting would
abound, whether they would go onto Medicaid, to emergency rooms,
or to their children for financial help. Younger people, particularly
taxpayers, will pay one way or another.
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(2) Does Medicare transfer monetary value from the poor to the
rich? It depends on how you count. The rich live longer so they are
both more likely to 1) live long enough to get Medicare and 2) enjoy
its benefits for more years. But they also pay more taxes than the
poor. So the evidence on monetary transfers is mixed. See, e.g., Jay
Bhattacharya & Darius Lakdawalla, Does Medicare Benefit the Poor?, 90 J.
PUB. ECON. 277, 278 (2006) (finding evidence of transfers from the
rich to the poor).
(3) Is Medicare inequitable among the old? That is, do the rich
beneficiaries get more out of the program than do the poor beneficiaries? Probably—but the poor show net gains too, and the gap is
shrinking. See Mark McClellan & Jonathan Skinner, The Incidence of
Medicare, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 257, 258 (2006); Jonathan Skinner & Weiping Zhou, The Measurement and Evolution of Health Inequality: Evidence
from the U.S. Medicare Population 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10842, 2004).
(4) How do rich compare to poor beneficiaries in terms of health
outcomes? Again, everyone benefits, but the poor probably do better.
See Skinner & Zhou, supra, at 2.
So, yes, there is evidence of inequitable redistribution. But what
should we do with this fact? I think that we should strive for temperance. Why? Because I doubt those poor patients want to give up
those life years they gained from the program just because someone
else got a better deal.
D. Envy
Unfortunately, it’s still too early in the analysis to start dancing on
the Devil’s grave. Professor Hyman is right to bemoan what can only
be described as shocking geographic variation in patterns of hospital
use, surgery, and medical spending. One look at a map of medical
treatment patterns is enough to make patients very queasy.
Medicare’s design, however, is only one of plenty of explanations
for this variation, many of which have to do with the nature of health
care and the scale of social insurance programs. Incentive systems
can’t be perfect. Information is hard to disseminate. Monitoring is
costly. Medical science is an uncertain business.
Further, we don’t know whether private alternatives would do any
better than Medicare at solving these problems. There are no neat
case control studies with relevant control groups because almost all
the elderly are covered by Medicare. There are plenty of studies
comparing various experiments within Medicare, but none that would
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allow anyone to conclude that elderly patients would spend less or get
higher quality care without it. Perhaps Americans are practicing temperance by not embracing the free market.
II. MEDICARE’S VIRTUES
A. Wisdom
Rather than continuing to address each vice and urge readers to
look a little deeper before despairing about Medicare, I’d like to shift
the focus of the discussion to how we should measure whether Medicare
has been a success or a failure. Health and monetary benefits are important, but they aren’t the only things that matter. What about Medicare’s value as an insurance program, one meant to reduce the risk of
high out-of-pocket spending on health care when it is needed? What
are the net insurance benefits for the elderly? For the poor? For the
rich? In other words, how valuable is Medicare insurance in terms of
risk protection to the elderly, many of whom were uninsured before
the program was started?
Before Medicare was enacted, many poor people were uninsured
or underinsured. Medicare provided risk protection to people who
were previously unable to get it. So it’s important to identify what
Medicare provided in terms of insurance value to its beneficiaries and
to identify “the differential insurance value between high and low income households . . . .” McClellan & Skinner, supra, at 258. From this
perspective, the results look pretty good. Beneficiaries at every level
of income show net gains from having access to the insurance provided by Medicare and the poor show bigger gains than the rich. Id.
at 270.
B. Fortitude and Justice
Even if Hyman is right about all this, we are left with the question
of what to do? Should we let the entirety of Medicare burn in Hell?
Since massive social programs are inevitably flawed, how should we
balance the various injustices? Hyman focuses on Medicare’s financing, oversight, and political problems. Yet his preferred design, one
more oriented to the market, would generate plenty of its own injustice. Why is that better?
It is too much to ask of anyone, even the Devil, to provide the diagnosis and the treatment for Medicare in a single rebuttal. So I hope
we’ll get there in the next round.
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CLOSING STATEMENT
Cooling Out the Marks, Medicare Style: Balancing
Demonic Vices and Cardinal Virtues
David A. Hyman
I appreciate Professor Horwitz’s willingness to review my satiric
book on Medicare, as well as the care and good humor with which she
undertook the task. That she was willing to do so when she was pretenure and had countless better things to do leaves me doubly in her
debt. Finally, she has added to my debt by her willingness to participate in this online exchange.
I particularly appreciate Professor Horwitz’s opening stipulation
that “[d]espite rumors to the contrary, Professor Hyman does not
work in the Devil’s employ.” Although I winced a bit at “rumors to the
contrary,” this is still considerable progress from a conference early in
my career, when a senior colleague in health law asserted that “mine
[were] the sort of views that caused the Irish potato famine.” David A.
Hyman, Medicine in the New Millennium: A Self-Help Guide for The Perplexed, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 143, 152 & n.43 (2000). In all fairness, Professor Horwitz’s formulation does not exclude the possibility that I am
an independent contractor working for the Devil—but that is the sort
of smart-mouthed observation that only a wiseacre former tax lawyer
(i.e. me) would make.
Let me begin with a half-dozen of the numerous areas of agreement between author and critic:
1. We agree that details matter, and readers should consult
the longer works to get the full flavor of both the book
and the review.
2. We agree that Medicare is enormous, growing fast, and its
distributional and economic consequences should be
more closely considered than has previously been the
case.
3. We agree that health care markets are complex and that
government is not to blame for all the deficiencies in their
performance.
4. We agree that Medicare is buying lots of care whose quality leaves much to be desired—in part because of perverse
incentives, such as paying the same amount (if not more)
for low quality care than for high quality care.
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5. We agree that there are “virtues buried in the Medicare
program” and that I slight them. (To be sure, to complain
that a satirical polemic is not “fair and balanced” is to miss
the point of the genre. More broadly, despite Professor
Horwitz’s title, the virtues she identifies are neither the
“cardinal virtues” of prudence, temperance, fortitude and
justice, nor the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity—although Medicare does considerably better when
judged by the latter (hope) than the former (prudence).
(It is unclear why two Jews have any business debating
Catholic doctrine. Blame Professor Horwitz. She started
it.))
6. We agree that Medicare succeeded in providing universal
coverage to a population that the private market was not
covering. Doing so required hundreds of billions of dollars per year—which we agree that Medicare is spending
inefficiently, while not doing much to purchase population health.
Lest the reader think that there is universal agreement, where do author and critic disagree?
First, we disagree on whether Medicare is sustainable in anything
like its current form. Professor Horwitz says that this is an “open question” that is “debatable.” She doesn’t have much company in that position. Every year, Medicare’s public trustees issue a report politely
noting that the current trends are unsustainable and reporting the
number of years until the Part A “trust fund” is exhausted. The latest
report, issued last month, includes the second consecutive “Medicare
funding warning” and calls for “timely and effective action to address
Medicare’s financial challenges . . . [including] the exhaustion of the
HI trust fund and the anticipated rapid growth in HI, SMI Part B, and
SMI Part D expenditures.” 2008 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary
Medical Insurance Trust Funds 4, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2008.pdf. As I noted in my original
submission, the U.S. Comptroller General was less polite, referring to
Medicare as a “fiscal cancer.” He also described the recently enacted
prescription drug benefit as “probably the most fiscally irresponsible
piece of legislation since the 1960s”—i.e. since the date when Medicare was created. 60 Minutes: U.S. Heading For Financial Trouble? (CBS
television broadcast July 8, 2007), available at http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/01/60minutes/main2528226.
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shtml. He has since quit his job as Comptroller General, and is working full-time on a “fiscal wake-up tour” that focuses on the federal
budgetary implications of entitlement programs like Medicare. Reasonable people can disagree on whether the program’s unfunded liabilities are exactly $36 trillion, as estimated by Medicare’s trustees to
cover the next seventy-five years (or $85 trillion for an indefinite time
horizon), but one needs a stronger argument than that it is “an open
question” to dispute the bipartisan agreement on the fiscal and budgetary fix we find ourselves in. See Joseph Antos, Medicare’s Bad News: Is
Anyone Listening?, AEI HEALTH POLICY OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for
Pub. Pol’y, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2008, at 3, available at
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.,pubID.27825/pub_detail.asp.
We also disagree on the extent to which health care spending and
moral hazard are serious problems. Professor Horwitz states that
overall spending can’t be a problem unless it keeps us from buying
things we really need, and moral hazard can’t be that big a problem,
because no one voluntarily chooses to consume health care. Space
precludes a full response, but a simple thought experiment makes the
point. If we offered program beneficiaries the cash value of the riskadjusted premium necessary for them to purchase coverage comparable to Medicare, how many would buy back into the program? I bet
relatively few would opt for the open-ended, no-expense spared, “machine that goes ping” (referring to the classic Monty Python sketch)
coverage that Medicare provides. See THE MEANING OF LIFE (Universal Pictures, 1983). Most would use the savings (if not the entire
amount) for non-medical purposes.
What about those currently paying into the system—would they
continue to participate if they could opt out? Professor Horwitz must
believe that they will, since her sunny prediction is that “they’ll not
only have their turn to be beneficiaries, they’ll be quite happy to find
that they are consuming something much better: tomorrow’s medicine.” This position is implausible on its face. Medicare is a mandatory government program precisely because it is a negative-sum game
for everyone other than those who get in early and those who provide
services to program beneficiaries. More bluntly, Medicare only
“works” because of forced contributions from “marks” outside the system.
If people spending their own money don’t want what the Medicare program is offering, we are by definition spending more on
health care than we should, and, in doing so, we are undermining the
fiscal integrity of the nation as a whole. The satiric thesis of my book
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is that only the Devil could come up with something that fiendishly
clever.
We also disagree on the extent to which we should be concerned
about Medicare’s distributional implications. Professor Horwitz argues that Medicare beneficiaries are all better off as a result of the
program. However, this argument misses the point—one does not
judge the merits of a pyramid scheme by looking at the amounts received by those lucky enough to cash out early. As I said previously,
the essence of Medicare is that it robs from the (working) poor and
lower middle class (who are disproportionately uninsured) in order to
pay for insurance for the middle and upper classes. One might defend this arrangement (with some degree of embarrassment) on the
grounds that everyone will get their fair share eventually, but if the
projections about Medicare are even remotely close to right, that just
isn’t going to happen. It is for this reason that virtually all employers
(including the state of Michigan, where Professor Horwitz works) have
abandoned defined benefit retirement plans (which Medicare is
modeled on) and adopted defined contribution plans.
Although Professor Horwitz agrees with me that there are numerous deficiencies with the Medicare program, she argues that comprehensive market-oriented reform is inappropriate since a market-based
system will “generate plenty of its own injustice.” No system is perfect,
but the strategies outlined in my book (including means testing, paying beneficiaries a risk-adjusted defined contribution, repeal of Medicare Part D, greater competition, and prudent purchasing) are more
likely to focus our resources on those who need it the most, and do so
in a more affordable and sustainable fashion than the status quo.
What’s so demonic about that?
To highlight the challenges created by Medicare, and give Professor Horwitz a broader target at which to shoot, let me offer a satirical
job posting for the next program administrator:
Wanted: Medicare Administrator
Salary: Not nearly enough, given what you have to put up with.
Top Ten Tasks:
1. Spend less on health care (to keep Congress and the Administration from calling for your head);
2. Spend more on health care to avert the 7% cut in physician payments scheduled to take effect next year (to keep
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providers from calling for your head, and patients from
doing so once they can’t find a doctor to treat them);
Improve the quality of care that is delivered by using appropriate carrots and sticks—but don’t interfere with the
way in which providers deliver health care, particularly if
the provider delivering low quality care has the ear of a
Congressman or employs lots of people in a swing district;
Buy lots of pharmaceuticals for seniors, but don’t pay too
much (or Congress and the Administration will have your
head) or too little (or the pharmaceutical companies will
stop developing innovative products);
Using inadequate and dated information, set the price
that will be paid by Medicare for every single good and
service beneficiaries need in every county in the United
States;
Prepare the program for the impending tidal wave of baby
boomers, who will stop paying into the system and start
expecting benefits in 2011;
Keep a straight face while you explain that the Medicare
program will be there for future generations, even though
your trustees have determined that putting one part of the
program in actuarial balance for the next seventy-five
years will require an “immediate 122-percent increase in
the tax rate or an immediate 51-percent reduction in expenditures.” 2008 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees
of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds 19, http://
www.cms.hhs.gov/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2008.
pdf;
Keep your temper when called before Congress to explain
why the Medicare program keeps gobbling up the federal
budget, when it was Congress that set the program on
auto-pilot to do exactly that;
Save up money to live abroad once you retire, because
your life won’t be worth a plugged nickel once those who
have paid into Medicare for their entire lives realize it
won’t be there for them—and also realize that those administering the program knew that all along;
Walk on water in your (non-existent) free time.
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Finally, my reply is titled “cooling out the marks, Medicare style.”
This is a reference to a well-known article by a famous sociologist, on
con games and the social process of adaptation to failure:
Sometimes, however, a mark is not quite prepared to accept his loss
as a gain in experience and to say and do nothing about his venture. He
may feel moved to complain to the police or to chase after the operators.
In the terminology of the trade, the mark may squawk, beef, or come
through. From the operators’ point of view, this kind of behavior is bad
for business. It gives the members of the mob a bad reputation with
such police as have not yet been fixed and with marks who have not yet
been taken. In order to avoid this adverse publicity, an additional phase
is sometimes added at the end of the play. It is called cooling the mark
out. After the blowoff has occurred, one of the operators stays with the
mark and makes an effort to keep the anger of the mark within manageable and sensible proportions. The operator stays behind his team-mates
in the capacity of what might be called a cooler and exercises upon the
mark the art of consolation. An attempt is made to define the situation
for the mark in a way that makes it easy for him to accept the inevitable
and quietly go home. The mark is given instruction in the philosophy of
taking a loss.

Erving Goffman, On Cooling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of Adaptation to
Failure, 15 PSYCHIATRY 451, 451-52 (1952).
The occupational hazard for Medicare’s defenders is the tendency
to become coolers on the program’s behalf. Professor Horwitz largely
avoids this temptation, although she is not (yet) willing to concede
how hot things actually are in the place in which we find ourselves.
The same cannot be said for Medicare’s more ardent defenders, who
routinely justify and excuse Medicare’s pathologies on the grounds
that it is a “sacred inter-generational trust,” and not just another mediocre government program. Yet, even these ardent defenders may
eventually find themselves wondering, in the dark of night, how it
came to pass that they became coolers, giving instruction to the poor
and working classes on the philosophy of taking a loss at the hands of
a program that was supposed to help them, but ended up treating
them as marks. With friends like that, who needs enemies?
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CLOSING STATEMENT
Medicare for Mortals
Jill Horwitz
Last month Medicare’s Board of Trustees released their 2008 Annual Report in which they predicted Medicare spending over the next
seventy-five years. As Professor Hyman points out, that the report includes yet another Medicare funding warning is cause for concern.
The CBO estimates of the long-term outlook are even worse.
But let’s think for a moment about what health care looked like
seventy-five years ago. In 1933, scientists were experimenting with
penicillin but it wasn’t mass produced until 1944. The Nobel Prize in
Medicine was given to Dr. Thomas Hunt Morgan for discovering the
role that the chromosome played in heredity. Congress weighed in
on whether to require that vitamins be put into lipstick. People were
just beginning to buy health insurance. Participants at the 1933 AMA
convention were urged to embrace eugenics as the hope for the country.
What were they predicting about the future of medicine seventyfive years ago? Eminent surgeons from around the world were told
that
[t]he medical man of the future . . . would “tune in” on the living body
as one does now on the ordinary radio. . . . Long before there was any
outward evidence of disease, the physician-radio-engineer of the future
would thus be enabled to tell by the “reception” of the “life-waves”
whether they were playing a melody of health or whether they were signaling an SOS.

William L. Laurence, Crile Advances Life Ray Theory as Medical Basis,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1933, at 1. In 1933, the editor of the Journal of the
American Medical Association decried both the introduction of group
medical practices and the growth of the hospital because “from 85 to
90 percent of [inpatient] cases could be treated by a general practitioner with equipment that ‘can be carried in a handbag.’” Assails Report on Medical Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1933, at 31. That same year,
attendees at a Harvard Medical School lecture were told that medicine
had inappropriately disregarded the health of the elderly. Urges
United Drive to Extend Longevity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1933, at 14. Who
counted as the elderly? People over 50.
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We shouldn’t mock these people for their erroneous predictions.
These prognosticators were well-educated, informed, and at the top of
their professions. But they were enough degrees off that we find their
guesses amusing in hindsight. Why do we think we can do any better
at making predictions about what will happen in 2083? We don’t
know how shifts in research from anatomy to biochemistry will change
medicine, never mind how much they will cost. They may save us
money; they may not. Given all this uncertainty, it is not surprising
that historical projections of the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund’s insolvency date have varied so much.
Now pile political uncertainty onto technological and financial
uncertainty. Despite years of predictions of Medicare’s imminent demise, it’s never happened. Why? Congress has never let it happen.
Congress can, and does, change the program. It isn’t bound to current federal policy, and it isn’t going to let federal health care spending consume more than one-hundred percent of GDP, a prediction of
some current models. Congress can limit benefits, restructure the
program, or raise taxes. And perhaps raising taxes to cover some high
level of care is the right answer. As I’ve noted in our previous exchanges, some economists have convincingly argued that previous
spending hasn’t been profligate but, rather, shows good investment
sense—we have gotten more than our money’s worth from health care
spending. If this is right, we shouldn’t be blinded by our worries
about costs—we should be thinking, at least as much, about spending
more efficiently.
Regardless, whether Medicare is sustainable over the long term is
not likely a question that we can answer with much precision. It’s also
why Professor Hyman’s Doomsday prediction that there will be no
gruel left for us after today’s elderly are done gorging themselves on
high-tech medicine is nothing but speculation—and less supported
speculation than what he calls my “sunny prediction” that tomorrow’s
medicine is going to be better than today’s. Would you prefer bloodletting or a Tylenol for your headache?
Fortunately the question about whether the current edifice of
Medicare can stand over the long term is not the most important. We
should instead focus on a series of interconnected questions that we
might be able to answer. How much health care do we want? What
are we willing to spend on it and, therefore, what are we willing to give
up in terms of consumption of other goods? How can we make sure
we are buying the good stuff and not the bad stuff? How can we fairly,
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responsibly, and accurately quantify the answers? How do we implement reforms while avoiding perverse incentives?
First—and here is something that Professor Hyman and I agree
on—we should strive to provide care that people want and not provide
care that they don’t. What’s the best way to determine what people
want? Professor Hyman wants to offer future beneficiaries the (riskadjusted) cash value of the coverage a beneficiary receives and ask
whether they want to use it to buy Medicare coverage. He claims that
they wouldn’t and then concludes that this is evidence that people
think Medicare is a sham—an albatross people would chuck if given a
chance.
But this thought experiment misses the point of insurance. Insurance isn’t meant to buy a predictable package of predetermined
goods—it is supposed to protect people from the big, unpredictable
hits. Ask people whether they would spend the cost of their premium
to get the benefit of insurance if they end up with a catastrophic illness, even if their probability of getting some awful disease is low. Ask
them if they’d like to face the choice of paying grandpa’s hospital bills
for some life-saving treatment or junior’s college tuition. I bet that
question would generate a different answer about the value of Medicare insurance than the one Professor Hyman would ask.
This brings us to a second, deeper point of disagreement: the
role of moral hazard in health care consumption. Moral hazard is the
ugly cousin of insurance. People will consume more when others are
paying, and insurance is a way of making other people pay. Professor
Hyman says that I think moral hazard can’t be a big problem in health
care consumption because it isn’t pleasant to take medicine. My point
wasn’t that there is no moral hazard in health care. There almost certainly is. My response was meant to emphasize that it is very hard to
tell how much moral hazard there is, where it is, and what to do about
it. The risks of intervening and getting it wrong are high.
Imagine the following two insurance plans that cover eyeglass
purchases. Plan 1 allows you one new pair per year and Plan 2 allows
you two new pairs per year. I bet that more people under Plan 2 will
get two pairs per year than those under Plan 1. Maybe a few of those
people under Plan 2 buy two pairs because their prescription changed
and they would have bought the two pairs even if they were insured
under Plan 1. The rest are getting the second pair because someone
else is paying, not because the insurance allows them to access important care that improves their health or because getting the second pair
helps the rest of us (like a vaccine). The structure of Plan 2 looks
wasteful, and comparing the dollar value of eyeglass purchases under
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each plan is a pretty good way to quantify the waste. This, however, is
a trivially easy case. Imagine the scenario of covering open heart surgery (which, by the way, attracts few casual participants).
The difficulty in examining the extent of moral hazard in the
health insurance context is that having health insurance lets people
get more care than they otherwise would and that additional care may
be 1) wasteful, or 2) protective of the rest of us, or 3) good for the patient and worth the cost, or 4) some combination of these. Simply observing that people get more care when they are insured than when
they aren’t insured doesn’t get you very far in figuring out how much
moral hazard exists in health insurance or what to do about it.
Professor Hyman understands all this and thinks the free market
can save us. This view of the private sector is puzzling. We have a private sector and, on average, it isn’t doing any better in containing
costs or cost growth than the public sector. Why? In large part because medical technology is growing, and lots of what that technology
does, although not all, is to help us live longer and healthier lives.
As Professor Hyman notes, we agree that one way to get at the
problem of high costs might be to do a better job on providing higher
quality care. (I say “might” because providing higher quality care is
not always cost-saving.) We need to figure out how to promote and
pay for the good stuff and avoid the bad stuff. Fortunately, there is a
lot that we can do that we aren’t doing as suggested by the extreme
geographic variation in medical spending, variation that implies widespread inefficiency. We are currently buying medicine that doesn’t
help and may even hurt people. Good estimates suggest that such
spending accounts for around one-third of total health care spending.
We need to figure out what we’re doing wrong, and stop: not only to
save enormous amounts of money, but also to save lives.
But, again, I suggest that Professor Hyman overlooks the complexity of the problem and, therefore, the difficulty of finding the right solution. Patients aren’t great consumers. They have a hard time telling
whether the medicine they received helped, hurt, or did nothing.
Even researchers can’t yet identify good, neutral, or bad spending.
We can’t rely only on health policy researchers pursuing their own interests to give us the answers. At a minimum, we need the kind of systematic, coordinated analysis that is best produced through targeted,
government funding. See John E. Wennberg et al., Extending the P4P
Agenda, Part 2: How Medicare Can Reduce Waste and Improve the Care of the
Chronically Ill, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1575 (2007).
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Understanding these complexities sheds some light on why embracing the market in the extreme through individual health savings
accounts—one of the reforms that Professor Hyman hints at endorsing—would likely be harmful. Most people just want to get help from
the medical system when they need it, and they don’t want to have to
understand all kinds of things about risk and probability to get their
entry ticket. They don’t know how much a plan should cost, which
plan to pick, or what their expected probability of illness will be over
the years. Think about how difficult it is to pick a plan for those of us
who are lucky enough to have a few insurance choices. Just this year I
gave a talk to my faculty on health insurance and used the University
of Michigan benefits plan as an illustration. In preparation I read the
charts that summarize the plan options, but found the terms hard to
compare. So I did a lot of digging and read a few eighty-page contract
“summaries.” I couldn’t ever figure out how to get the (no doubt)
thousands of pages of underlying contracts that the university had negotiated on my behalf. Let’s just say the search and decision costs are
high.
Recent advances in economics have taught us that having more
choices is not necessarily good. In the health insurance context, more
choice has often meant more adverse selection, a problem that is at
least as big for health insurance markets as is moral hazard. In addition, when people face complicated information and difficult choices,
they often make bad choices. They tend to be too sensitive to upfront
costs relative to long term gains (subprime mortgages, anyone?). Patients tend to stop taking drugs when the price goes up a little even
when the long term value of the drug is enormous. Looking at another experiment in individual purchasing gives some guidance. With
the growth of individual retirement accounts, average savings has
gone up but so has variance. If you care at all about equality, this is a
big deal.
So far in this debate I have mainly focused on the ways in which
Professor Hyman’s reasoning has been over-simplified and his proposals likely to lead to negative unintended consequences. But, of
course, even if we knew how much moral hazard there is, which
spending is wasteful, and who is gaming the system, that still wouldn’t
suffice.
We need to both deal with costs and cost growth. And we need to
deal with the distinct issue of dangerous and inefficient spending. We
should, however, do so carefully, using the right kind of incentives. So
at the time we continue to investigate, we should apply the many tools
that we have in our toolbox, market based and otherwise. These in-
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clude information technology (for example, computerized physician
order entry), pay for performance, disease management, medical protocols, preventive care, chronic care management, care coordination,
and more. We’ve tried some of these approaches here and there, in
certain regions, in pilot programs, and in small trials. That’s not
enough. We need more comprehensive implementation than we’ve
had before, because piecemeal action won’t cut it. If you squeeze the
balloon in one place, it will bulge in another. This is one of many reasons why major reforms to huge payer programs like Medicare and
Medicaid offer a unique opportunity for safety and for cost control.
Helping Medicare take a step in the right direction towards controlling spending and improving quality will have reverberations that will
be felt everywhere. Let’s tread carefully.
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